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TO SAVE A LIFE: WHY A RABBI AND A
JEWISH LAWYER MUST DISCLOSE
A CLIENT CONFIDENCE
Russell G. Pearce*
I. INTRODUCTION
The buzz of the intercom startled Rabbi Paula Samuels' as she
prepared to leave the synagogue to go to Loyola Public Defender
Services. Ever since her graduation from law school the year before,
she had been volunteering one night each week for the public
defender. Upon retiring from the pulpit next June, she planned to
volunteer for the public defender two or three days a week.
She had asked the receptionist to hold all calls. Why was the
intercom buzzing? Reuven, the receptionist, informed her that Ben
Jones was here to see her and that Ben looked pretty distraught. She
remembered Ben. She had officiated at Ben's bar mitzvah twenty
years ago. Ben had been a bit of a wise guy, but a decent kid. After
the bar mitzvah, Ben and his family had left the synagogue. She
remembered hearing that he had developed a drug problem and had
been in and out of trouble with the law for the past twenty years.
Oh, well,... she still had fifteen minutes before she had to leave.
"Send him in."
Although Ben was now in his midthirties, she could still see
traces of the smiling thirteen-year-old boy he had been.
"Welcome, Ben. What can I do for you?"
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Yale University,
B.A. 1978, J.D. 1981. I am grateful for the comments of Michael Broyde, Bruce Green,
Michele Hirshman, and Burt Visotzky. Thanks to my friend, teacher, and former student
Sam Levine, for his invaluable assistance. I would also like to express my appreciation to
my research assistants Deborah Lichtenstein, Larry Metz, Jennifer Nierenberg, and Moe
Shapiro.
1. The Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review's hypothetical for this Symposium
provided the Rabbi's name, as well as the names Frank Smith and Ben Jones. I use Paula
Samuels, rather than Paul, to challenge the assumption that all rabbis are men and to
reflect the reality that many rabbis are women.
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"Thank you for seeing me, rabbi. I heard you were working with
the PD. I need some advice and I thought that as a lawyer and rabbi
you'd be the right person to help me."
Ben began to cry. He explained that seven years ago he had
killed a police officer during an attempted bank robbery. Frank
Smith, who had nothing to do with the robbery or murder, was to be
executed for the crime in a few days. Ben did not want to see Frank
Smith die, but he also did not want to die himself or face a life in
prison.
Rabbi Samuels paused. This was not quite what she expected.
She excused herself to call the public defender and explain that she
would be at least an hour late. When she returned, she began talking
with Ben about how he felt, what he wanted, and what he could do
to prevent Frank Smith's death. After a lengthy discussion Ben
concluded, "I know what the right thing to do is, rabbi, but I just
can't do it. I can't face the risk to myself." He got up and ran out of
the office before Rabbi Samuels could say anything else.
Now Rabbi Samuels had a dilemma. She believed Jones's
confession. She had information indicating that an innocent man was
about to die. As a rabbi, did she have any obligation to keep that
information confidential? Did it matter that she was also a lawyer?
She was aware that in contrast to a Catholic priest, Jewish
tradition provided no duty of confidentiality for a rabbi different from
that of other Jews. From a Catholic perspective, the priest cannot
disclose confessional communications because he learns them acting
as God or God's representative.2 In contrast, the rabbi is a teacher
and does not stand in a special relationship to God.3
II. ARGUMENTS FOR CONFIDENTIALITY
Nevertheless, Rabbi Samuels thought of at least four arguments
for preserving confidentiality. One applied to all Jews. The other
three derived from the religious implications of secular constructions
of the role of lawyer or rabbi.
2. See Dexter S. Brewer, The Right of a Penitent to Release the Confessor from the
SeaL Considerations in Canon Law and American Law, 54 JURIST 424,429-30 (1994); see
also Anthony Cardinal Bevilacqua, Confidentiality Obligation of the Clergy from the
Perspective of Roman Catholic Priests, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1733,1734 n.5 (1996) (noting
that the sacramental seal of confession was divinely instituted by Jesus Christ); Teresa
Stanton Collett, Sacred Secrets or Sanctimonious Silence, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REV 1747, 1755
(1996) (noting the seal of confession derives from Christ's commandment).
3. See THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JUDAISM 579-80 (Geoffrey Wigoder ed., 1989).
JEWISH DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
The first and foremost argument involved the traditional Jewish
requirement that all Jews, regardless of occupation, preserve
confidences. Jewish tradition generally forbids the disclosure of
confidential information as "a terrible invasion of another person's
privacy."4 This interdiction, rooted in the Torah's prohibition on
talebearing,5 applies even when the information disclosed is true.6
The great medieval commentator, Maimonides, observed that gossip
"ruins the world."7 He further reproached "the evil tongue of the
slander-monger who speaks disparagingly of one's fellow, even if the
truth is told."8
Accordingly, the Jewish tradition developed the general rule that
information must be kept confidential absent an express waiver of
confidentiality. In the Talmud, Rabbah stated that "if a man had said
something to his neighbour the latter must not spread the news
without the informant's telling him 'Go and say it.'"" As Rabbi
Alfred S. Cohen observes, Jewish tradition teaches that "anything at
all which someone tells you must be treated with strict confidentiality,
unless or until he gives you permission to repeat it."' This rule
suggested that Jones's refusal to permit disclosure would bar
Samuels's disclosure.
A second argument for confidentiality arose under the principle
dina de-malkhuta dina, "the law of the land is the law."" This
doctrine does not mean that secular law substitutes for Jewish law in
all respects. Rather, it requires obedience to secular law insofar as it
is not unfairly applied" and is not inconsistent with provisions of
4. Alfred S. Cohen, Privacy: A Jewish Perspective, J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SOC'Y
53, 73 (1981); see also Norman Lamm, The Fourth Amendment and Its Equivalent in the
4.fe16
Halachah, 16 JUDAISM 300, 305 (1967) (noting that disclosure constitutes a privacy
violation).
5. Leviticus 19:16 (Jewish Publication Society).
6. Janise Poticha, When the Physician is Sero-H.I.V. Positive, in REFORM JEWISH
ETHICS AND THE HALAKHAH: AN EXPERIMENT IN DECISION MAKING 163,166 (Eugene
B. Borowitz ed., 1994).
7. Id. (quoting Maimonides).
8. Id. (quoting Maimonides).
9. YoMA § 4b (I. Epstein & Leo Jung trans., The Soncino Press 1960Y.
10. Cohen, supra note 4, at 81 (discussing privacy).
11. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 51 (3d ed. 1974).
12. Id. at 53.
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"fundamental importance" to Jewish law, 3 including but not limited
to, "religious or ritual observances."' 4
Here, two parallel secular legal rules could be read to require
nondisclosure. Jones confessed confidential information to Rabbi
Samuels. Although neither of them clarified the situation, Jones
stated that he came to talk to her because she was a rabbi and
because she was a lawyer. Assuming that the confidential communi-
cation was made to her in both of these capacities, relevant law could
be read to require confidentiality.
As adopted by courts and legislatures, lawyer's ethical codes have
the force of law.'5 They require a lawyer to keep information
confidential unless the lawyer knows the client will commit a future
crime.
16
The harm to Smith would not come from any crime on the part
of Jones. Indeed, the crime to which Jones confessed is a crime which
occurred in the past. Accordingly, without parsing the complexities
of the duty of confidentiality, 7 for purposes of this analysis, one
could assume that confidentiality as a lawyer is required.
The situation with regard to clergy is similar, but less clear. State
legislation creates a congregant-clergy privilege which protects
confidential communications from a congregant to a clergy from
disclosure in court." As a general rule the congregant, and not the
clergy person, owns the privilege and has the authority to decide
whether to waive it.'9 This would bar Rabbi Samuels from testifying
in court or submitting an affidavit regarding Jones's confession. It
13. Aaron Kirschenbaum & Jon Trafimow, The Sovereign Power of the State: A
Proposed Theory of Accommodation in Jewish Law, 12 CARDOzO L. REV. 925,926 (1991).
14. 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, supra note 11, at 53. Dina de-malkhuta dina "is an
extraordinarily difficult and complicated subject." Kirschenbaum & Trafimow, supra note
13, at 940. This Essay does not purport to offer a complete theory of its contours.
15. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 206 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1993) [hereinafter HAZARD, LAW OF LAWYERING]; CHARLES
W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 2.6.1, at 51-52 (1986).
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 (1995); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980).
17. For a more complete discussion of these rules, see 1 HAZARD, LAW OF
LAWYERING, supra note 15, § 1.6:100.
18. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1033 (West 1995) (granting privilege to the penitent
to refuse to disclose or prevent another from disclosing penitential communications);
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 76.2 (John William Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992) (noting that all states have adopted a privilege protecting communication
between clergy and penitents).
19. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1033.
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could arguably be read to imply the establishment of a duty of
confidentiality with regard to public disclosure as well.
Perhaps as a rabbi, and certainly as a lawyer, Samuels's duty
under secular law gives rise to an obligation of confidentiality under
dina de-malkhuta dina.
A third, and related, consideration arose from the policies
underlying the legal duties of confidentiality. Jewish tradition
recognizes that sometimes the interests of the individual must be
sacrificed for the good of the community.2' Could the harm of
disclosure to society outweigh the benefit of potentially saving Smith's
life?
Rabbi Alfred S. Cohen makes such an argument.2 ' He objects
to the Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California decision
which held a psychiatrist liable for failing to disclose his client's intent
to commit a murder' Rabbi Cohen asserts that permitting disclo-
sure will harm society by discouraging individuals from seeking the
professional assistance they need and, if they seek assistance, from
making the full disclosure necessary to obtain the benefit of profes-
sional advice.24 The same arguments have been made for protecting
lawyer's confidences and one could therefore extend Cohen's analysis
of Tarasoff to argue for nondisclosure of Jones's confidence. One
could also argue that a policy of encouraging consultation with rabbis
similarly favors nondisclosure.
Rabbi Cohen further offered a fourth argument for nondisclo-
sure. He argues that under Jewish law "a person whose livelihood
depends upon maintaining the confidentiality of revelations made to
him, need not jeopardize his position by telling those secrets."'
Rabbi Samuels could conceive that disclosure would imperil her legal
career. It might result in termination of her work with the public
defender's office and might make it impossible for her to practice
criminal defense. Her intuition was different with regard to her
rabbinical career. Although some congregants might object to her
20. See Alfred S. Cohen, On Maintaining a Professional Confidence, 7 J. HALACHA
& CoNTEMP. SoC'Y 73,84 (1984).
21. Id. at 80.
22. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
23. Cohen, supra note 20, at 82-83. While criticizing Tarasoff, Cohen does not offer
any particular rule of his own. Rather, he advises a professional facing such a dilemma
to seek the advice of competent halakhic authority. Id. at 84-85.
24. IA. at 82-83.
25. I at 83-84.
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revealing Jones's confidence, she doubted that the disclosure would
result in discharge before her retirement or in an insurmountable
barrier to seeking another pulpit, should she decide to end her
retirement.
III. WHY THE RABBI AND LAWYER SHOULD DISCLOSE
As she considered these powerful arguments for confidentiality,
Rabbi Samuels reflected on two related duties which she thought
might provide more powerful arguments for disclosure.
The first was the duty not to "stand idly by the blood of thy
neighbor,,2 6 which applied quite literally to the impending death of
Frank Smith. Indeed, the duty not to stand idly by has been
construed expressly to require producing evidence that "favors the
accused" in a criminal case.'
A second, related duty of pikuach nefesh, or preserving life,
strengthened the obligation not to stand idly by as applied to Smith's
execution. The Torah instructs us to "choose life."' The Talmud
teaches that God first created one human being "to teach you that if
anyone destroys a single human being, the Torah considers that
person to have destroyed the whole world; and whoever rescues a
single human being, the Torah credits that person with having rescued
the whole world."' 9 To save a life, one may violate all of Jewish law,
except idolatry, incest and adultery, and murder."
Accordingly, in this case, the combined duties "not to stand idly
by" and "to preserve life" outweighed the Jewish legal obligations of
confidentiality and dina de-malkhuta dina.31 But before she could
26. Leviticus 19:16 (Jewish Publication Society 1955).
27. W. GUNTHER PLAUT & BERNARD J. BRAMBERGER, THE TORAH: A MODERN
COMMENTARY 901 (W. Gunther Plaut ed., 1981) (summarizing commentary of Sifra and
Targum Pseudo-Jonathan); cf Leviticus 5:1 ("And if anyone sin, in that he heareth the
voice of adjuration, he being a witness, whether he hath seen or known, if he do not utter
it, he shall bear his iniquity.")
28. Deuteronomy 30:19 (Jewish Publication Society 1955).
29. BARRY A. CYTRON & EARL SWARTZ, WHEN LIFE IS IN THE BALANCE: LIFE
AND DEATH DECISIONS IN LIGHT OF THE JEWISH TRADITION 73 (1986) (quoting
SANHEDRIN 4:5). See also YOMA, supra note 9, § 85b (citing Leviticus 18:5 to the effect
that you should live by the commandments and not die by them).
30. SANHEDRIN 74a (The Soncino Press 1969).
31. For commentators who have reached a similar result, see MICHAEL J. BROYDE,
THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES ON THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 25-29 (1995) (arguing that Jewish law requires disclosure of a client's intent
to physically harm another); Gordon Tucker, The Confidentiality Rule: A Philosophical
Perspective with Reference to Jewish Law and Ethics, 13 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 99, 104-07
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finally determine that these duties required disclosure, Samuels had
to figure out whether she could save Smith's life without disclosure,
whether disclosure would indeed save Smith's life, and whether the
harm of disclosure would outweigh the harm of silence?
She could think of no alternative to disclosure which would help
Smith. Jones had stormed out of her office and she knew of no way
to contact him to try again to persuade him to come forward. She
knew of no other way to demonstrate Smith's innocence. Smith's
execution was imminent and delay in disclosure could cost his
attorney precious time.
On the other hand, it was not clear that if she disclosed Jones's
confession, she would save Smith's life. Courts might exclude her
testimony on grounds of privilege. Even if her testimony were
admissible, courts would look skeptically on the last minute introduc-
tion of a confession to save the life of a person on death row,
especially where the confession included no details which would lend
it credence.
Where Jones's confession would be admissible would be in the
political process-the battle to obtain clemency from the governor
and gain the support of the public. Again, the lack of details would
limit its effectiveness but Samuels thought that if a rabbi or lawyer
risked her reputation to reveal the confession of a congregant or
client, the politicians and the public might very well give credence to
the confession.
To have an obligation to disclose, Samuels did not have to decide
that she would definitely prevent Smith's wrongful execution, only
that she possibly could. As Maimonides observed, even the possibility
of saving a life is sufficient to justify violating other Jewish laws?3
Here, Samuels faced that possibility.
Samuels's last consideration addressed the potential harms of
disclosure to Jones, to herself, and to society. Her disclosure would
turn the prosecution's attention toward Jones and an investigation
(1985) (arguing that Jewish tradition requires a lawyer to disclose confidential information
to prevent physical or financial harm); cf J. David Bleich, Professional Secrecy, in 2
CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIC PROBLEMS 74-80 (1979) (noting a doctor's "[r]espect for
privacy and the inviolability of the professional relationship certainly do not take
precedence over protection of the lives and safety of others").
32. Cohen, supra note 4, at 76-78 (discussing the Chofetz Chaim's guidelines for
disclosure of a confidence).
33. MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, LAWS OF
SHABBAT ch. 2, law 1 (Philip Birnbaum trans., 1974)
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could possibly lead to his conviction and execution. If Jones were
guilty, his execution might accord with Jewish law,34 and even if it
did not, it would be a lesser evil than the death of the innocent Smith.
Rabbi Hershel Schachter notes that where the Jewish offender has
violated a Torah law, such as murder, "[t]here is no problem ... in
informing the [secular] government of a Jewish criminal, even if they
penalize the criminal with a punishment more severe than the Torah
requires.""5
Moreover, if Jones were innocent notwithstanding his confession,
the same factors which limited the value of disclosure to Smith also
limited their harm to Jones. Jones could use the privilege to block
Samuels's testimony and the prosecutor's use of the fruits of
Samuels's disclosure. Even if the police and prosecution were some-
how able to use the information, it would be of little value because it
lacked specificity.
The enormity of the potential harm to Jones made Samuels
uneasy about considering harm to herself. She needed to respond to
Rabbi Cohen's suggestion that a professional need not risk one's
livelihood to disclose a confidence. While the Jewish tradition is clear
that one need not risk one's own life to save a life, "[h]ardship,
suffering and great inconvenience ... cannot serve as bases of
exemption." '36 Despite this teaching, Cohen asserts that the com-
mand "not to stand idly by" should be treated as a positive-as
opposed to a negative-command because it requires action and "a
Jew is not required to spend more than 1/5 of his income in the
fulfillment of a" positive commandment 7
Samuels found more persuasive a contrary perspective grounded
in Maimonides's commentary. In a manner similar to Cohen,
Maimonides distinguished the two types of negative commandments.
Violations of negative commandments breached by action resulted in
punishment by lashes while negative commandments violated
passively, like "do not stand idly by," did not receive such a punish-
34. See, e.g., J. David Bleich, Capital Punishment in the Noachide Code, in 2
CONTEMPORARY HALACHIC PROBLEMS 341 (1983) (discussing whether, and under what
circumstances, Jewish law would accept the imposition of capital punishment by secular
courts).
35. Hershel Schachter, "Dina De'Malchusa Dina": Secular Law as a Religious
Obligation, 1 J. HALACHA & CONTEMP. SoC'Y 103, 118 (1981).
36. Aaron Kirschenbaum, The Bystander's Duty to Rescue in Jewish Law, 8 J.
RELIGIOUS ETHics 204, 213 (1980).
37. Cohen, supra note 4, at 83.
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ment. Maimonides, however, went on to assert that even though
violation of the duty "not to stand idly by thy neighbor's blood" was
not punishable by lashes, it was equally serious because of the
traditional emphasis on saving a life.38 Samuels agreed. Where the
nonclient would die, the principle of pikuach nefesh had to override
considerations of livelihood.
Last, she turned to Rabbi Cohen's argument that the importance
of confidentiality to society was more important than harm to an
individual. Cohen's assertion of the necessity for absolute confidenti-
ality 9 accorded with the traditional arguments for lawyer confidenti-
ality and made sense intuitively. Recently, some commentators have
questioned whether a guarantee of absolute confidentiality is
necessary to encourage clients to confide in lawyers.' Indeed, the
ethical rules themselves have long had exceptions for lawyers to
exercise their discretion to disclose confidential information to defend
themselves and collect fees, as well as to disclose certain crimes.4'
But even assuming that Cohen's assertions were correct, Samuels
had to disagree. At this moment, she did not have to determine all
the exceptions to confidentiality Jewish tradition would require. She
had one issue before her: a matter of life or death. She would follow
the teaching that if you save one life, it is as if you have saved the
entire world. The balance of harms had already been recognized by
tradition. Only the three extraordinary commandments regarding
murder, idolatry, and adultery could not be violated to save a life.
Even if some harm would come to society from her disclosure, she
must do it.
IV. CONCLUSION
Samuels reached for the phone to call Smith's attorney. She was
unhappy. She would be betraying someone who had confided in her
as a rabbi and a lawyer. She would be throwing her rabbinate into
turmoil and jeopardizing her career as a lawyer. But she had to do
whatever she could to try to save a life.
38. MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Book 11,
The Book of Torts ch. 1, para. 16 (Hyman Klein trans., 1954).
39. See Cohen, supra note 4, at 87.
40. See, eg., Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351,380-
83 (1989).
41. See supra note 16.
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